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I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
The economic liberalization measures that began in Mozambique in 1987 under the Economic
Rehabilitation Program (ERP) have unleashed enormous change in the way food is marketed in the
country.  Nowhere has the response been greater than in the so-called "informal" marketing sector of
the capital city of Maputo.
The term "informal sector" has become increasingly common, even in academic circles, despite the lack
of a precise and widely accepted definition.  In this work, the term will be used with regards to any
person participating in the food trade without a legal trader's license.  This definition includes traders
operating without licenses who nevertheless pay stall rental fees to municipal authorities.  Such traders
are in a legally ambiguous situation.  While they may be argued to enjoy de facto legality, mere
tolerance from authorities can change quickly in Mozambique's volatile setting.  Recent heated public
debate regarding the desirability of the continued existence of this sector underscores this point.
The informal sector has assumed a rapidly growing role in providing food for the mass of low income
consumers in Maputo/Matola, and areas as far north as Gaza and Inhambane provinces.  The more
established informal market places in Maputo show strong links to the formal marketing system. 
Within Maputo, the informal system has almost entirely supplanted the urban ration system (Novo
Sistema de Abastecimento - NSA), and its retail sales far outpace those of the formal sector retail
shops known as lojas.
Despite the large and growing importance of this sector, little systematic information exists regarding
its organization and function.  Such knowledge is essential if the Government of Mozambique (GRM)
is to design a coherent and socially beneficial response to this phenomenon.  The need for such a
response is made more urgent by the increased levels of organization and investment now reflected in
much of the informal sector.  It has become increasingly evident that this sector will not simply "go
away".  
For these reasons, the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique (MOA), in collaboration with Michigan
State University Department of Agricultural Economics (MSU), and with funding from the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), undertook the first phase of the Maputo
Market Study during June, July, and August 1992.  This study was part of a broader set of research
and policy dialogue activities carried out under the MOA/MSU/USAID Food Security Project in
Mozambique.  The work was specifically associated with and benefited from the ongoing data
collection and research activities of the Agricultural Market Information and Analysis System (SIMA),
which is operated under the Food Security project and located within the Division of Prices of the
National Directorate of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture.
The objectives of the Maputo Market Study were:
1. To develop an initial description and preliminary analysis of the structure and conduct of the
informal food wholesaling and retailing sector in Maputo, with emphasis on the marketing of
maize grain and flours, 
2. To quantify the principal costs incurred and approximate margins earned by traders in the
sector, 
3. To analyze price behavior in the sector and assess the efficiency and effectiveness of its
markets, 1  Each of these reports provides a detailed analysis of selected aspects of the informal food marketing
system in Maputo.  See especially "The Maputo Market Study: Research Methods", for a discussion of
the methods used and problems encountered during the study.  Other reports are "Food Price Behavior
in the Maputo Informal Sector"; "The Economics of Food Aid Pricing and Distribution: Lessons From
Mozambique"; and "The Maputo Market Study: Synthesis of Research Findings and Policy
Implications".
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4. To evaluate the effects of food aid, especially commercialized U.S. yellow maize grain food
aid, on the organization and behavior of the sector, and on prices paid by consumers,
5. To diagnose the principal problems facing the sector, and
6. To evaluate the consequences of alternative actions on the part of the Government of
Mozambique (GRM) and donors to address these problems.
This study focused on the more established informal markets and their links with the formal sector,
especially the licensed wholesalers known as armazenistas.  No attempt was made to study the new,
very small informal markets which continue to emerge.  Too, the formal sector lojas were not studied
except as they intersected with the informal sector.  
This report is one of several based on the Maputo Market Study.
1  It focuses on the first two objectives. 
The report is organized as follows.  Section II briefly describes the Maputo Market Study.  Section III
places the informal sector in context historically, in terms of its relationship to the formal sector, and
with regards to the policy environment in which it operates.  Section IV identifies and describes the
function of the principal informal market places in Maputo. Section V examines the organization and
behavior of informal food wholesaling in Maputo, while Section VI does the same for informal food
retailing.  Section VII discusses key findings and policy issues.2  See "The Maputo Market Study: Research Methods" for a more detailed description of the study.
3
II. THE MAPUTO MARKET STUDY
2
A.  Overview of Study Activities
The research activities associated with the Maputo Market Study included rapid appraisals preceding
the arrival of the research team, a series of formal interviews and data collection activities from late
June through August 1992, and on-going data collection and analysis designed to extend and refine the
knowledge gained during the first phase.  
The research team began developing its knowledge of the informal food marketing sector in Maputo in
late 1990 and early 1991, with the design of the SIMA.  Rapid market appraisal activities directly
related to the Maputo Market Study began in April 1992.  Team members conducted systematic market
visits, met with and interviewed members of the Association of Cereals Processors (APROC), and
visited many local maize mills.  Based on the knowledge gained, researchers made a tentative selection
of markets to be studied, developed an initial design for the formal data collection activities, and
produced questionnaire forms based on this design.  Final rapid appraisal work in June allowed the
design and questionnaires to be refined, and markets to be selected.
Formal data collection activities included regular price monitoring in Bazuca, the principal informal
food wholesaling market in the city, Xipamanine, the largest retail market, and two other retail markets;
periodic intensive monitoring of inflows and outflows from Bazuca; and a series of interviews with
wholesale Bazuca traders and retail traders in selected markets.  Since the end of the intensive formal
data collection in August, price monitoring has continued on Tuesdays and Thursdays (in addition to
the normal Saturday SIMA collection).  The research team also designed two additional questionnaires
to investigate changing supply sources over time, and the trading history of wholesalers.  These have
been completed periodically since August as needed.  These and other questionnaires will be used
strategically over time to continue investigating specific issues.
B.  Market Events During the Study
This report draws heavily from the research activities just described.  These activities were carried out
in a highly volatile market with rapidly changing supply conditions and imperfect, unequally distributed
information.  One key finding of the study was that the behavior of the informal markets changes with
supply conditions.  Thus, it is important that these results be understood in the context of the market
events which influenced them.4
Figure 1.  Research Activities Matrix, MOA/MSU/USAID Maputo Market Study (June 29 -
August 25, 1992)3  The "caneca" has become the standard unit of measure for nearly all dry goods in informal sector
Maputo markets.  It is a 750 ml can that orignally held powdered milk.  Filled over the rim with
product from the market, it holds between 800 ml and 850 ml.
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Figure 2. Weekly Yellow Maize Grain Prices in Xipamanine Market, Late April-
September, 1992
The top portion of Figure 1 presents the timing of selected market events and behavior from June 29
through the end of August, when formal data collection activities took place.  The bottom portion of the
figure presents the schedule of research activities carried out during this time.  
Commercial yellow maize food aid last arrived before the formal data collection activities on May 9,
when a ship with 32,000 MT of U.S. grain arrived in port.  Yellow maize grain prices fell dramatically
from very high levels following this arrival (Figure 2).  As the study began in late June, however, a
yellow maize scarcity was beginning to develop.  The first row of Figure 1 reveals both a strong
upward trend in retail yellow maize grain prices and increasing instability around that trend through the
end of July.  By the week of July 27, caneca prices reached a peak of Mt 1,000, only to fall to Mt 450
as commercial food aid grain arrived from a European Economic Community (EEC) shipment.
3  The
price increases can be ascribed to the growing scarcity, while the growing instability might be explained
by uncertainty regarding the timing of the ship's arrival.  Once the EEC boat began to unload, prices
fell quickly and dramatically.  Within a week, they stabilized at lower levels.  For each week thereafter,
the spread between the weekly high and low prices was only Mt 100/caneca.  Arrival of a commercial
food aid grain shipment from the United States only two weeks after the EEC shipment likely
strengthened this outcome.  6
Thus, the study was conducted across two distinct periods of yellow maize supply.  The beginning of
the study in late June through July was marked by a growing scarcity, with extreme price fluctuations. 
With the arrival of the EEC boat on July 28 and the U.S. boat two weeks later, August was a month of
relative abundance and stability.
The EEC and the U.S. organized their maize distribution shipments quite differently, providing an
excellent opportunity for study.  The EEC delivered its 15,000 MT of grain in equal amounts to just
two consignees.  In stark contrast, 27 consignees unloaded 22,000 MT of grain from the U.S. shipment,
and the largest received just 13.5% of the total.  Through very careful price monitoring and frequent
informal interviews in the market and in the formal sector wholesaling area known as the Baixa, the
research team documented an example of a short term price increase potentially caused by the market
power created by the delivery of 15,000 MT to only two traders.
C.  Products Studied
The Maputo Market Study included a number of the staple foods that are traded in the market, but
focused most carefully on maize grain and meals, due to their predominance in the diets of low income
consumers.  A great variety of maize meals is traded in the market, and each tends to carry a different
price.  Thus, it is important to understand clearly the characteristics of each.  The following discussion
is adapted from Weber, et al.
Consumer preference in Mozambique for maize meal is affected by the color and level of processing of
the final product.  In general, white is preferred to yellow, and more processing is preferred to less. 
However, informal markets in Mozambique have clearly differentiated maize meals by price, with less
refined yellow meals being cheapest, and more refined white meals being most expensive.  The result is
that poor consumers choose to consume the less refined yellow meals because of their low price, while
higher income consumers purchase and consume more refined white meals or move out of maize meal
entirely.  
Maize meals are made commercially and by hand pounding.  Hand pounded meals are typically
considered to be of the highest quality, and are generally produced only with white grain.  There are
three major types of hand pounded meals, each of which is produced by purchasing maize grain and
then hand processing it.  All forms of these traditional products remove the germ and bran (know as
farelo in Portuguese).  Hand Pound Meal-Pilão is a very high quality meal that is made by first
removing the germ and bran by hand pounding in the pilão, next soaking the remains in water for 1 to 2
days (deixar de molho), and then preparing the final meal, also by hand pounding in the pilão.  The
meal that emerges from the second pounding must be sun dried, which can take another day, depending
on the weather.  Hand Pound Meal-Alguidar is an alternative method used mostly in the South of the
country to make a maize paste that is cooked immediately, in contrast to meal which can be stored for a
number of days.  This product is made by first removing the germ and bran by also hand pounding in
the pilão and then soaking the remains for 1 or 2 days.  Next the soft corn remains are placed directly
into a shallow bowl (alguidar) and slowly mashed with a wooden instrument.  After preparing, a paste
like material is carefully placed, a little bit at a time into boiling water to prepare the chima.  This
product still requires at least two days to prepare, although it is quicker than making a final meal in the
pilão.  Hand Pound/Custom Milled Meal is a variation on the first method.  The first stages are
similar, with the pilão being used to remove the farelo.  Then the final stage of processing is done in a
small custom hammer mill located in the neighborhood, rather than in the consumers' own pilao.  Grain
can thus be de-germed and made into meal in the same day, as the de-germed grain can be immediately
taken from the first state processing in the pilão directly to the local hammer mill (if there is one)
without having to soak the remains for 1 to 2 days.  This method of preparation, while faster, still takes7
a number of hours, given the various steps.
There are also three main types of wholly machine processed maize meals.  Whole meal is produced by
small custom service hammer mills spread throughout the cities of Maputo and Beira, and in many
rural areas as well.  Dry whole grain is placed directly into the hammer mill.  Since the germ and bran
are not removed, whole meal has a 97-99% extraction rate.  Thus, except for minor impurities, almost
all of the grain put into the mill emerges as meal.  Across much of Southern Africa this meal is referred
to as mugaiwa.  Partly de-germed meal has had only a part of the bran and germ removed by a
commercial process.  Normally produced only in large commercial mills in Maputo and Beira, this
meal generally has an 80-96% extraction rate per 100 kgs. of grain.  This product is referred to as
partly sifted meal, bolted meal, or roller meal in most SADC countries.  Fully de-germed meal has had
most of the bran and germ removed by a commercial milling process.  This has a 60-75% extraction
rate per 100 kgs. of grain.  It is referred to as super-sifted meal or sometimes breakfast meal in
SADCC countries.  Prior to independence, this product was made in Mozambique and was sold under
the brand name Celeste.  Many consumers still refer to this brand name as a type of very high quality
maize meal.  This quality meal is also referred to in Mozambique as farinha matabicho because it is
consumed at breakfast (matabicho).  Most of the white maize meal which is imported informally from
Swaziland and Zimbabwe is this high quality farinha matabicho.  Commercial mills in Maputo and
Beira have the milling equipment to manufacture this quality product, but produce very little, if any, for
the open market.
To make matters more complicated, machine processed maize meals exhibit quality differences within
each type, depending on the milling technique utilized, the quality and degree of impurities in the grain,
and whether or not vitamins have been added to enrich the meal.  Each of these characteristics may
affect price, but are not immediately apparent to researchers.
Rapid appraisal interviews with hammer mill operators indicate that the product made by the small
hammer mills spread throughout the neighborhoods of Maputo and Beira is generally whole meal. 
Some consumers take hand pounded maize without germ and bran to be milled in these informal
establishments, although mill operators say this is a relatively small part of their business.  White and
yellow meal manufactured by the large commercial mills in Maputo (CIM) and in Beira (Mobeira)
generally has some of the germ and bran removed, and hence the meal is considered to be of higher
quality than whole meal.
An objective of maximizing benefits of maize as food aid for low income groups would generally result
in the decision to encourage poor consumers to acquire grain directly and/or to acquire and consume
whole meal.  Likewise, to the extent that food aid in the form of maize grain is milled into higher
quality meals, the aggregate supply of products for direct human consumption will be diminished. 4  Little (1992) indicates that informal markets existed in the early 1980's, and that prices were
liberalized for these products in 1985.  Even so, the ERP in 1987 "completely transformed" the nature
of trade in vegetables and fruits, as informal marketing grew extremely rapidly.  The ERP also
transformed trade in the food staples that this report considers, but the response in these products was
slower, since price regulation proceeded at a slower pace.
5  See Sahn and Desai, 1992.
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III. THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN CONTEXT
The informal food marketing sector in Maputo exhibits three characteristics which must be appreciated
if its current status and future prospects are to be understood.  First the informal sector is still very new
and is evolving rapidly.  Second, it emerged in the midst of a formerly centrally controlled economy
undergoing great stress.  Finally, it operates within a policy environment that creates great uncertainty
regarding the sector's current practices and future prospects.  
A.  Historical context
The informal sector first began to appear openly in 1987, shortly after the beginning of the ERP
4. 
Groupings of traders, overwhelmingly women, began to appear on street corners selling very small
quantities of basic foods to passersby.  These incipient markets were illegal and suffered from frequent
police harrassment, thus the use of names, still common today, such as dumbanengue ("trust your feet"
in the local dialect).  Today, this sector is a rapidly evolving system of wholesale and retail markets
supplying a wide range of food items to the great majority of consumers in Maputo and Matola.  More
recently, this sector has exhibited growing internal differentiation.  New retail markets much like the
original dumbanengues continue to emerge on street corners and empty lots, with little or no supporting
physical infrastructure.  At the same time, many of the original dumbanengues have developed into
established market places with large numbers of traders and increasing physical infrastructure.  As the
informal retailing sector has expanded, informal wholesalers have emerged to serve them.  This
informal wholesale trade shows clear and direct links to the registered wholesalers (armazenistas) and
retail store owners (lojistas) of the formal marketing sector.  Thus, the distinction between the formal
and informal sectors is beginnning to blur.  
This emerging commercial system has now extended north into Gaza and Inhambane provinces (Figure
3), moving commercial food aid and other products back and forth and helping to equalize prices and
relative supplies in the two areas.  Within Maputo, it has almost entirely supplanted the urban ration
system (Novo Sistema de Abastecimento), as product officially destined for these stores is marketed
through the informal sector.  Depending on the product analyzed, the sector's total value of sales is
between three and 14 times greater than that in the lojas.
5  9
Figure 3.M a p  o f  M o z a m b i q u e6  This very brief history of the develoment of the Xipamanine area was developed from information
collected during rapid appraisal missions in October 1990; January, March, June-July, and November
1991; and February and April, 1992; from the Maputo Market Study of June-August, 1992; and from
interviews with traders in 1993 regarding the development of the area.
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The evolving nature of the informal sector is illustrated by developments in the area around
Xipamanine market since 1990
6 (Figure 4; see also Figure 5 for the location of Xipamanine in relation
to other markets in the city).  By at least late 1990, Xipamanine had become the most important retail
market for low income consumers in Maputo.  Already by this time, retail traders had expanded beyond
the established portion of the market, which enjoyed a concrete floor and hundreds of individual trading
stalls.  Many stalls were made of thatch, and erected on bare ground.  Wholesale activity took place
just outside the retail area.  Trucks pulled-in and sold product by the bag either directly to retailers or
to an emerging set of small scale wholesale traders.  Dominantly women, these traders bought
numerous bags from trucks and resold to retailers.  Some bought yellow maize grain, had it milled into
locally processed meal, and sold the meal by the bag to retailers.  Wholesale activity of this kind, while
not merely sporadic, did not occur every day.  
By early 1991, this activity was large enough that it could no longer be conducted immediately outside
Xipamanine market.  At this point, wholesale transactions were shifted to the area known as Bazuca,
some 300 meters beyond Xipamanine and very near what had become a bus terminal.  With the
establishment of Bazuca, the informal wholesaling sector began to grow and establish itself.  It is
dominated by women (86% of the total) who obtain their product by the bag from various sources, pile
their bags on the ground at Bazuca, and sell by the bag to retailers from the immediate area and from
other informal retail markets in Maputo.  Called "floor traders" or "redistribution wholesalers" in the
present study, these traders provide the crucial link between the informal retail trade and the formal
sector armazenistas and state enterprises which serve as the ultimate supply sources for many
products.
With growth in the volume of product moving through Bazuca, retail traders began to spill out of the
established portion of Xipamanine market, until they lined the road all the way to Bazuca.  About a
year later, by early 1992, retail activity had spread further and taken over what had been a soccer field. 
This new market, appropriately called Campo de Futbol, is similar to the early dumbanengues in that it
has no physical infrastructure of any kind.  Traders sit on the floor with their product in shallow
baskets (peneiras) or on cloth spread on the ground.  The market is much larger than any of the early
dumbanengues, however, and now exceeds Xipamanine proper in the number of traders.
Thus, over the course of a year-and-a-half, the number of retail traders in the area increased several
times while creating a completely new retail market, and a specialized wholesaling area emerged and
grew very rapidly.  The research team does not have similar first hand observation over time of other
markets in Maputo, but interviews with traders indicate that other informal retail market places
experienced rapid growth during the same time.
This nascent marketing system will continue to evolve in the future, both physically and in the type of
behavior it exhibits.  The path it takes, though, will be strongly influenced by government policy and
possibly by formal sector pressure.  Each can have an enormous 11
Figure 4.T h e   Xipamanine Area12
effect on how the system develops and on the role it ultimately plays in meeting the needs of poor
consumers in Maputo and beyond.
B.  Relationship to the Formal Sector
As the informal sector has grown in size and organization, it has forged ever greater links with the
formal sector.  These links are especially strong with the officially licensed wholesalers known as
armazenistas.  The consignees that have first access to food aid are armazenistas, as are many of those
the consignees sell to.  Armazenistas also dominate commercial imports of rice and other products that
arrive in the port of Maputo.  As such, informal traders depend on these well capitalized firms for their
supply of these products.  Floor traders interviewed in Bazuca frequently mentioned the names of
specific armazenistas as their supply source.  Many informal traders have also forged links with the
official wholesale trade in Swaziland.  Whether individual men with relatively abundant capital, or
groups of less capitalized women pooling their money to rent a truck together, these traders conduct an
active cross-border trade in sugar, refined white maize meal, wheat flour, and vegetable oils, among
other products.  Finally, state enterprises have become important suppliers of yellow maize and rice to
the informal sector through sales of commercial food aid.
The relationship between informals and armazenistas is highly symbiotic.  Informals provide formals
with an alternative market outlet, often at prices above those officially set by the government.  Without
supplies from the formals, the informal traders would likely have access to a far more narrow set and
smaller volume of products to trade.
Informals' relationship with formal sector retailers (lojistas) is more ambiguous.  The most obvious
aspect of this relationship is competitive: informal retailers sell to consumers that would otherwise have
to buy in the lojas.  But there is also a symbiotic dimension to this relationship.  Shop owners who
receive quotas of yellow maize grain and flour as part of the NSA may choose to sell to informal
redistribution wholesalers rather than in their own shops.  While difficult to confirm, researchers are
confident that they observed such transactions during the study.
This partial symbiosis betwen informals and formal sector retailers may largely be a result of the
continued existence of administrative distribution mechanisms through the NSA.  One might expect
such a relationship to end if the NSA is eliminated and not replaced with a similar system.  But the
direct competition between the two may also be temporary.  As the entire food marketing system
develops over time, it seems likely that the formal and informal sectors will both undergo a process of
differentiation, with each becoming well established in different market niches.  As is typical in many
other countries, the informal sector will continue to serve primarily the poorest consumers, while the
formal sector will provide a somewhat different and broader set of products and enhanced services to a
higher income clientele willing to pay higher prices.  This differentiation has already begun in the
formal sector, as small supermarkets accepting local currency have emerged, driving some duty-free
shops (which accepted only foreign exchange) out of business.  
The complementary relationship between the informals and the armazenistas will likely continue in the
area of imported foods.  With neither the capital nor the organization to manage international imports,
informals will have little choice but to depend on the large formal sector wholesalers.  Informal sector
expansion could, however, be dramatic in domestically produced foods.  Research has already
established that some Maputo informals (many of them women) travel directly to producing areas
during the harvest to buy white maize, beans, and other products.  As peace and renewed rains bring
more normal harvests and increased marketings, entrepreneurial informals should find opportunities to
expand greatly the scope of their activities without relying on formal sector traders.  13
C. The Policy Environment
The emergence of the informal sector was met first with official opposition.  Trading was disrupted and
traders jailed for selling without licenses.  This government reaction was beginning to recede by 1989,
but without any clear new policy to replace it.  Whether due to ambivalence regarding the proper
response to the phenomenon, or some other reason, government largely stood back as the sector
expanded enormously.  The vast majority of informal traders never received trading licenses, but many
were charged fees by municipal authorities, based on the space they occupied or the approximate value
of product they transacted.  The result was a very large and very important economic sector operating
in an uneasy state of quasi-legality.  More recently, vocal pressure from lojistas has forced a
reexamination of the desirability of the informal sector as it currently exists.  Proposals to curtail its
activities by various means have been given prominence in the official press.  
It seems highly unlikely that government, even if it desires to, will be able to reduce or even control the
size of this sector.  Informals have emerged and expanded their activities in the food marketing systems
of practically every developing country that allows, or cannot effectively prohibit, private trading of
food.  There appear to be two fundamental causes, often referred to as "demand pull" and "supply
push", of this worldwide phenomenon.  On the demand side, informals serve the market demand of poor
consumers in a way that the formal sectors, as they have operated to date, have not.  They do so by
providing different products and packaging them differently than in the formal sector.  A good example
in Mozambique is maize meals.  Unrefined yellow whole meal is the cheapest staple on the market,
other than yellow maize grain.  Furthermore, since a consumer purchasing yellow grain would have to
hand pound it prior to consumption, the convenience value of the already milled grain is very high for
urban consumers, even the very poor.  Lojas do not sell this meal, but many hundreds of informal
retailers do.  Partially refined meal is found in both sectors.  But in lojas, it is often sold pre-packaged
in 2.5 kg or 5 kg bags.  Informals sell the same product in much smaller quantities, which is preferable
to poor consumers who tend to make daily purchases of small amounts.  Finally, formal sector stores
provide a "service" - a more sanitary and orderly shopping environment - that is valued by higher
income consumers, but which many poor consumers would rather not pay for.  Thus, formal and
informal sectors typically provide different products and a different bundle of services, and thus serve
different clientele.  As long as significant numbers of poor consumers exist, the informal sector will
likely continue to serve it.  
This "demand pull" on the informal sector is often complemented by a "supply push".  This term refers
to the existence of large numbers of very poor people with few alternative income earning
opportunities.  Thus, the supply of labor is very high.  Petty trade generally has low entry barriers, such
that anyone with some amount of capital may enter.  Thus, poor consumers are "pushed" into petty
trade for lack of more remunerative and accessible alternatives.  These supply effects have certainly
been important in Maputo, with the large number of displaced persons from the war.  Their importance
relative to demand side effects can easily be exaggerated, however.  This study did not collect
information on the amount of time traders have been resident in Maputo.  But Little, in his study of
vegetable and prepared food traders, found that 71% had been resident in the city for at least 15 years. 
None of these traders could be plausibly argued to be displaced by the war.  Of the remaining 29%, it
does not appear reasonable to assume that all have been displaced.  Thus, less than 30% of vegetable
and prepared food traders surveyed by Little appear to be displaced by the war.  Further research is
needed to determine the length of residence in Maputo of staple traders.
Government policy may have enormous impact on how well the informal sector can serve its poor
clientele.  Will the government take an active role in facilitating and shaping the development of the
sector into a more efficient and effective means of distributing healthy and low cost food to the large14
masses of poor consumers?  Or will it ignore and periodically hinder the sector?  The latter will likely
condemn the informal sector to a low-level equilibrium of small traders eking-out a living, providing
food to poor consumers at prices higher than would be found in a more progressive and dynamic
system.  The negative welfare effects of such a policy on poor consumers could be severe.7 This corresponds roughly to what is also called the "cement city".  It is contrasted with the "peri-
urban zone", which is also called the "cane city".  The latter has grown up over the past decade, and is
characterized by thatch huts and relatively little municipal infrastructure.  The cement city was
constructed earlier and in general has more permanent structures, paved streets, and other
infrastructure.  
8  Baixa means "low-lying" in Portuguese, indicating that this area is lower in altitude than the rest of
the city.  
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IV. PRINCIPAL INFORMAL MARKET PLACES IN MAPUTO
The urban zone
7 of Maputo has at least seven relatively large and established informal retail market
places (Figure 5).  These markets are served by the redistribution wholesale market of Bazuca, located
very near Xipamanine and Campo de Futbol.  Wholesalers in Bazuca obtain their product from two
principal sources.  Private sector armazenistas are most important, and most have their warehouses in
the area near the port known as the Baixa
8.  Many traders also cite the state enterprises EACM
(Empresa de Abastecimento da Cidade de Maputo), CIM (Companhia Industrial-Matola), and
COGROPA as important supply sources.   Yet the unquestioned heart of the informal food marketing
system in Maputo is the Xipamanine-Campo de Futbol-Bazuca complex.  
A. Large Scale Wholesaling: Armazenistas and State Enterprises
The informal food trading sector in Mozambique ultimately depends on the formal sector for its supply
of many goods, especially imports.  Findings from three separate data collection efforts indicate that
private sector armazenistas are the single most important supply source for Bazuca floor traders,
followed by state enterprises and trade with Swaziland.  First, monitoring of product arriving in Bazuca
during four different three day periods of July and August, 1992, indicated that 75% of all product
entering the market had been purchased from Mozambican armazenistas.  State enterprises (EACM,
COGROPA, and CIM) followed with over 12%, and Swaziland and South Africa were close behind
with 11%.  Second, separate interviews with Bazuca floor traders during July and August, 1992,
indicate that they purchased 52% of their total volume of maize grain and meals, wheat flour, rice,
sugar, and peanuts in the Baixa.  Finally, in a separate survey carried out weekly from September to
November 1992, 56% of all traders interviewed indicated that they had obtained their maize grain and
flours from suppliers in the Baixa.  Thirteen percent cited state enterprises.  Thus, while the product
groups, timing of the interviews, and exact numerical results differ, all sources coincide in showing
armazenistas in the Baixa to be the single most important supply source for informal wholesalers. 
Two of the three also show state enterprises to be significant suppliers.  It is worth noting that the
drought which affected the entire Southern African region in 1991/92 drastically reduced the flow of
product, especially white maize meal, from Swaziland to Maputo.  Had this drought not occurred, the
importance of supplies from Swaziland would have been far greater.  With the peace accord, domestic
supplies of many products should also increase substantially.
B. Redistribution Wholesaling: Bazuca
Informal wholesale traders provide the link between the large scale armazenistas and state enterprises,
and the very small scale informal retailers.  Armazenistas and state enterprises have no interest in
selling small numbers of bags at a time, while most informal retailers do not have sufficient capital to
purchase more than one or two bags.  Informal wholesalers bridge this gap, buying by the truckload
from formal sector wholesalers and selling by the bag to retailers. 16
Figure 5. Partial Map of the City of Maputo, with Location of Principal Informal Market Places9  Based on actual trader counts conducted by SIMA enumerators.
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These informal wholesalers are centered in Bazuca.  Retailers in five informal markets  were
interviewed on a weekly basis from September to November, 1992, regarding their supply source for
white and yellow maize grain and meals.  Over 60% indicated that they had purchased their product
from informal wholesalers in Bazuca.  Nearly 22% had purchased in their own market, and only 6.5%
had purchased from wholesalers in the Baixa.  Bazuca is also a very important supply source for the
relatively small number of informal wholesalers operating out of Xiquelene and Compounde markets. 
While 50% of these had made their purchases in the Baixa, nearly as many (47%) had purchased in
Bazuca.
C. Retail Markets
The seven principal retail markets are grouped in two different geographical areas (Figure 5). 
Xipamanine, Campo de Futbol, Mafalala, and Vulcano are located in the western part of the city. 
Compounde, Xiquelene (also known as Praça dos Combatentes), and Mucoriama are grouped closely
together in the northeastern section of the city.  There is some differentiation of function within these
groups.
Xipamanine and Campo de Futbol are nearly contiguous and in practice may be considered a single
market.  Together, they are clearly the dominant retail market in the city.  The established portion of
Xipamanine during March 1993 averaged nearly 280 traders of the products monitored by the SIMA. 
These do not include items such as fish, fruits and vegetables, condiments, meat, and prepared foods. 
Campo de Futbol averaged nearly 350 traders of the same products during March.  Each of these
markets carried 16 of the 27 products monitored by the SIMA, the highest of any market surveyed. 
Mafalala averaged only about 190 traders and carried only 13 of the products, while Vulcano averaged
174 traders and only 11 of the 27 products.  
The number of traders in clearly defined market places drastically underestimates the total number of
traders active in the area.  Too, many more food and non-food products are traded than the 27
monitored by the SIMA.  For example, Xipamanine is a center of the fruit and vegetable trade, both at
wholesale and retail.  Throughout the Xipamanine-Campo de Futbo-Bazuca area, and considering all
food and non-food products, nearly 5,000 people are involved in wholesale and retail trade on any given
day.
9
Together, the Mucoriama, Xiquelene, and Compounde markets cover a larger area and have more
traders than Xipamanine-Campo de Futbol.  Individually, Compounde is the largest market, with
about 280 traders and 16 of the 27 SIMA products (in addition to others not monitored by the SIMA). 
Xiquelene is the smallest, with only 130 traders and 11 of the SIMA products.  In the entire
Mucoriama-Xiquelen-Compounde area, and counting all traders of all products, the area has over
8,000 retail traders on any given day.  Xiquelene is an important wholesale redistribution point for the
northeastern markets, however, as reflected in Table 1.  To what extent Xiquelene operates
independently of Bazuca in this regard is not clear.  Researchers believe that Bazuca floor traders

























7.5 78.8 6.9 2.5 . . 1.9 2.5 100
Vulcano . 86.0 . . 2.3 1.2 2.3 8.1 100
Componde 9.4 55.0 26.9 2.5 1.9 . . 4.4 100
Mucoriam
a
11.8 38.7 25.8 16.1 1.1 . . 6.5 100
Xiquelen
e
1.7 40.3 47.9 . 5.0 . . 5.0 100
Total 6.5 60.2 21.8 3.7 1.9 .2 .8 4.9 100
Table 1. Retail Supply Sources: Percentage of Traders Purchasing in Each Location, by
Sales Market
V. INFORMAL FOOD WHOLESALING IN MAPUTO
The informal food trade in Maputo transacts many different products, including basic grains, various
meals and flours, beans, fruits and vegetables, vegetable oils, condiments, prepared foods, and basic
consumer items such as cloth, soap, kerosene, used clothing, and others.  The Maputo Market Study
examined yellow and white maize grain and flours, wheat flours, rice, beans, salt and sugar, and
vegetable oils, but paid special attention to yellow maize grain and flours.  These products are the
single largest expenditure item in the food budgets of the poorest 20% of Maputo households (Sahn and
Desai, 1992).  This section will also focus most closely, though not exclusively, on these latter
products.
A. Marketing Channels
1. Bazuca in the Retail Trade
Based on data collected from September to November, 1992, Bazuca is the principal supplier of maize
grain and flours to retail markets within the urban zone (Table 1).  Over the five retail markets
surveyed, more than 60% of all traders had obtained their product in Bazuca.  Nearly 22% bought in
their own market, and only 6.5% bought in the Baixa.  Enumerators did not survey Campo de Futbol
and Mafalala, but informal interviews, and their location close to Bazuca, indicate that retailers in
these markets also depend dominantly on this wholesale market for their supplies.  
There is some variation across markets in the importance of Bazuca.  Xipamanine and Vulcano are
most linked to Bazuca, and we expect Campo de Futbol and Mafalala to fall into this group as well. 19
Figure 6. Product Flow Through Bazuca, all Products, July-August 1992
Bazuca remains the single most important source for retail traders in Compounde and Mucoriama, but
purchases from small wholesale traders in their own markets increase substantially.  In Xiquelene,
purchases by retailers within their own market slightly outpace purchases from Bazuca.  Note however,
that Bazuca is likely an important supply source for the small scale wholesalers in these other markets.
Table 1 hides some apparent variation across products.  Processed yellow maize meal from CIM is
obtained almost exclusively in Bazuca, even among traders in Xiquelene, Compounde, and
Mucoriama.  In contrast, supply sources for yellow maize grain are more varied.  Overall, only 48% is
obtained in Bazuca, 28% comes from other traders in the same market, and nearly 10% is obtained in
the Baixa.  
Thus, it is clear that some small scale wholesaling takes place outside of Bazuca, especially in
Xiquelene market.  Note, however, that retailers even in these markets tend to rely more on Bazuca
than on small wholesalers in their own markets.  Too, the volume of transactions in Xipamanine,
Campo de Futbol, Vulcano, and Mafalala, each of which is dominated by Bazuca, is greater than that
in the three northeastern markets.  Finally, as noted earlier, Bazuca is likely an important supply source
for these small wholesalers in other markets.  Thus, Bazuca can be appropriately considered the
wholesale hub of the informal maize trade in the urban zone of Maputo.  Its role as a supplier for
outlying markets of the Maputo/Matola area and beyond to the provinces of Maputo, Gaza, and
Inhambane is less clear.
2. Product Flow Through Bazuca
Figure 6 summarizes study results on the relative importance of each supply source to Bazuca and the
destinations of product leaving Bazuca.  The figure is based on all products entering and leaving the
market when the research team monitored it.  The dominant channel is from armazenistas to Bazuca
floor traders, who sell to retailers from markets within the city of Maputo.  Three-quarters of all20
product entering Bazuca during the periods analyzed originated with Mozambican armazenistas, and
practically 90% was then purchased by Maputo city retailers.  
The timing of the data collection during the drought may have increased the apparent dominance of
armazenistas.  Informal traders generally have very important roles in the white maize meal trade with
Swaziland.  They are also active in purchasing domestically produced white maize from farmers,
though their relative share of this trade is unclear.  White maize supplies were extremely scarce during
this period, practically eliminating a major activity for informal traders.  Researchers expect that the
role of the armazenistas will be relatively reduced, though still quite important, when domestic










































GMA = Yellow Maize Grain
FMACF = Unrefined Yellow Maize Meal
Figure 7. The Structure of the Staple Food Trade in Bazuca10  1090/(5200-526) = .233.  CIM mills its grain into refined maize meal.
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Figure 7 presents more detail on marketing channels through Bazuca.  Two types of traders are worthy
of mention.  "Paper traders" have been observed primarily in yellow maize grain (GMA - grão de
milho amarelo in Portuguese), selling a type of receipt conferring ownership of the product.  These
traders are clearly differentiable from traders in Bazuca.  Unrefined yellow maize meal traders in
Bazuca have also differentiated themselves from other Bazuca traders.  Each will be dealt with in more
detail below.
3. The Food Trade Outside of Bazuca
Study results indicate with some certainty that Bazuca is the key wholesale redistribution point for the
urban zone in Maputo.  Data in Figure 6, and retailer responses from urban zone markets regarding
supply sources for maize grain and meals support this conclusion.  Bazuca's role in two other important
aspects of the marketing system is less clear.  First, what proportion of supplies reaching the peri-urban
zone and Matola pass through Bazuca?  Second, does any significant portion of the product reaching
Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane provinces from Maputo city pass first through Bazuca?  
Study results will not allow a definitive answer to these questions, but they do provide relevant
information.  First, observation and informal interviews with traders in the Baixa indicate that
significant amounts of yellow maize grain leave for Gaza and Inhambane provinces directly from this
area, without ever passing through Bazuca.  Second, reasoning would suggest that the largest traders in
these areas do business directly in the Baixa rather than in Bazuca.  Those with enough capital to buy
in the minimum quantities offered by armazenistas would do so, thereby reducing their cost.  Those
who cannot purchase in these large quantities due to capital or other limitations would be forced to
trade through Bazuca.  
A rough idea of Bazuca's share in the total volume of maize flowing through Maputo can be gleaned
from survey data on inflows to Bazuca, combined with data on daily ship unloadings.  Late in the day
on August 12 1992, the U.S. ship Lash Atlantic arrived in Maputo port and began unloading grain. 
Through August 21 (a period of 10 days), consignees unloaded approximately 5,200 MT.  During five
of these 10 days, the research team monitored arrivals and departures from Bazuca.  Expanding the
data on registered U.S. maize grain arrivals in Bazuca during these five days to cover the whole 10 day
period results in an estimated flow through this market between August 12 and August 21 of
approximately 1,090 MT, or 21% of the grain that was unloaded.  If we adjust for the 526 MT of grain
that was allocated directly to CIM off the boat during these same days, then 23% of all the grain that
could have passed through Bazuca actually did so.
10
These results apply only to the time period analyzed.  Different periods may give different results.  Too,
the analysis assumes that consignees quickly sold all the 5,200 MT that they unloaded during this time. 
If some of this grain went into storage, then Bazuca's implied share would increase.  So the results
should be taken as the minimum share that Bazuca would have had for this time period, but should be
understood as indicative only and subject to further corroboration.  Nevertheless, the implication is
that, while Bazuca is extremely important for the urban zone of Maputo, it may have a less important
role in supplying the peri-urban zone and beyond to the provinces.  23
B.  Wholesale Marketing Practices
Informal food wholesaling in Maputo is generally small scale, with rapid turnover of product and little
storage beyond three days to one week.  Most traders of the products analyzed have been engaged in the
activity for less than a year.  Exchange is nearly always by cash in the spot market.  Two
characteristics of the market are of special interest.  First, "paper trading" involves the buying and
selling of a type of warehouse receipt.  It may represent an authentic commercial innovation which
helps reduce transactions costs.  Second, a sharp differentiation among floor traders in terms of supply
source and purchase volumes is an interesting market adaptation which requires further study.
1.  Trading History
Over two-thirds of all floor traders in Bazuca have been in the wholesale trade for 12 months or less,
with a mean of 10 months.  Wheat flour and rice traders have the most experience, averaging nearly 13
months each.  Yellow maize grain and meal traders have the least experience, with an average around
nine months.  White maize grain and meals were absent from the market during the survey period, so
no information is available on traders of those products.  These findings compare with those of Little
(1992) in a study of prepared food and vegetable traders, who found that, as of 1991, nearly two-thirds
of interviewed traders had been in the trade for two years or more.
This relatively short tenure of staple food traders is perhaps unexpected, given that wholesale trading at
Bazuca has been active for at least two years, since early 1991.  This pattern would not seem to be a
reflection only of the rapid growth which has occured in the number of traders at wholesale, since only
two percent (3/150) of interviewed traders had as many as 24 months of experience at this level.  The
pattern could indicate a high rate of trader entry and exit.  This suggestion is more consistent with the
data.  It is also reasonable to expect a relatively high rate of entry and exit, in light of the low barriers
to entry, few sunk costs, and great volatility of the market.  It is easy for traders to get into the market,
and they do not have to invest in large amounts of fixed capital to operate.  If they decide after some
time that the trade is too risky or not sufficiently remunerative, or they have better alternatives, they
lose little by exiting.
It is also possible that individuals enter the wholesale trade by transacting small volumes of the least
expensive items, and, if successful, gradually increase their volume and move into higher value
products.  These higher value products might be some not monitored in this survey, such as sugar or
fruits and vegetables.  This pattern is suggested by the fact that the most common "path" for wholesale
traders was to begin as retailers of unrefined yellow maize meal (the cheapest staple in Maputo) and
then advance to selling yellow maize grain as floor traders in Bazuca.  Seventeen of the 150 traders
interviewed followed this path, while no more than eight followed any other.  Too, traders of both rice
and wheat flour, which are often two to three times more expensive than yellow maize grain or meals,
have on average more experience than maize traders.  
Thus, both rapid entry and exit and progression into higher value products are consistent with the data. 
It seems likely that some combination of these factors is at work.  Further research is need  to determine
which is most important, and what other explanations might exist.  
Over 60% of traders began at the retail level, though only 11% currently sell at that level in addition to
their wholesale activities.  Men were more likely to skip the retail trade and enter directly into
wholesaling.  Fifty-five percent of the men interviewed had done this, while only 36% of the women had
















Unrefined Yellow Maize Meal 292 200 20 77
Yellow Maize Grain 3,132 2,000 84 74
Refined White Maize Meal 1,249 600 63 100
Rice 1,344 1,250 100 100
Table 2. Purchase Volumes and Turn-Over, by Product, July/August 1992
Traders tend to specialize in a single product.  Thirty-one percent indicated that they never sell a
product other than the one they were selling when interviewed.  Sixty-one percent said that they
"sometimes" do so, and only 2% claimed to do so "frequently".  
2.  Scale of Operation, Product Turnover, Storage and Transport
The scale of operation of informal wholesalers tends to be small, though there are clear differences
across traders and products.  Product turnover is very rapid for all products, so that storage is very
short term (Table 2).  
By any measure, yellow whole meal traders are the smallest.  Among those interviewed in July 1992,
average purchase volumes of yellow grain for milling were about 300 kg, or six sacks.  Typical
purchases were of only three to five sacks, with a median and modal purchase of four.  Only 20%
purchased 10 sacks or more.  Turn-over was rapid.  Thirty-six percent had purchased their product the
day of the interview, and only 23% had purchased two days ago or more.  
Turn-over was also rapid for other products, but average purchase volumes were far larger.  Sellers of
yellow maize grain purchased a mean of more than 3,000 kg, or 60 sacks, with a median purchase of
2,000 kg.  Eighty-four percent purchased 10 sacks or more.  Rice and refined white maize meal traders
each purchased a mean of about 1,300 kg, though the median purchase of rice (1,250 kg) was more
than double that of refined white maize meal (600 kg).  Refined white maize meal also had more small
traders, with 37% purchasing less than 10 sacks.  All rice traders purchased at least 10 sacks.  
These characteristics of small purchase volumes and rapid turnover are consistent with the fundamental
role of the informal wholesaling sector, this being to serve as a bridge between the large armazenistas
and the very small scale informal retailers.  Were the food retailing sector in Maputo to be comprised
only of better capitalized lojas, the informal wholesaling sector would likely exhibit significantly
different characteristics from the one reported on in this study.  
3.  Paper Trading
"Paper trading" is an interesting innovation which researchers first observed immediately after the
arrival of the EEC boat on July 28.  Recall that the 15,000 MT on this shipment were delivered in11  EEC representatives indicated that they required 100% advance payment for the grain.  
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equal amounts to only two consignees.  In attempting to finance such a large purchase
11, at least one of
the traders sold a form of warehouse receipt to a relatively small number of traders before the boat
arrived.  Most of these appear to have been formal sector armazenistas who had no quota for this
shipment, and possibly had less access to capital as well.  Whether these "paper traders" paid cash for
the receipts at the time they received them is not clear.  What researchers observed were floor traders in
Bazuca who had purchased these receipts from the paper traders, paying in cash before receiving the
grain.  In essence, Bazuca floor traders financed some portion of the 15,000 MT for the armazenistas. 
Researchers also observed a form of paper trading on grain delivered to public sector consignees from
the August 12 U.S. shipment.  In this instance, it appears that lojistas belonging to the NSA, who have
a right to certain quantities of grain from EACM, may have sold portions of these quotas to Bazuca
floor traders without ever taking physical possession of the grain.  Floor traders were then able to use
the quotas they had purchased to obtain grain at EACM.  
This latter paper trading appears to be predicated on the existence of an administered system of grain
distribution, and on the willingness of those within the system to sell outside of recognized channels.  If
the NSA is replaced with an income transfer scheme, as has been proposed (Teller, et al.), then this
type of trading would likely disappear.  Paper trading between armazenistas and floor traders, on the
other hand, may be an authentic commercial innovation with positive payoffs for the food marketing
system.  Such trading may reduce the costs of transactions by separating exchange of ownership rights
from physical exchange of the good.  By eliminating the need for physical exchange each time the good
is sold, handling and transport costs are reduced.  
Trading of warehouse receipts is widespread in industrialized countries, and has typically preceded the
development of modern commodity futures markets.  An owner with physical possession of product
deposits the product in a warehouse and is issued a receipt.  The owners of the warehouse legally
certify that product is in inventory, hence the buyer of the receipt is assured that actual product can be
obtained if necessary.  The system was designed and has functioned in such a way that all actors in fact
trust that possession of a receipt guarantees real ownership of a good.  Thus, the receipts have become
widely traded, eliminating many physical transactions which would otherwise have to take place.
In Mozambique, however, the system is at best incipient and suffers from some problems.  Recall that
prices were extremely high immediately prior to the arrival of the EEC boat.  As the boat arrived, grain
moved immediately to Bazuca, and prices fell rapidly.  In the span of two days, retail prices of yellow
grain fell from Mt 1,000/caneca to as low as Mt 450/caneca.  Wholesale prices (prices charged by
floor traders in Bazuca) fell from Mt 42,000/sack prior to the arrival to Mt 26,000/sack the day after. 
Prices then moved up slightly (see discussion of the reason for this in section VII below) until a ship
with maize from the U.S. arrived on August 12.  At this time, a group of floor traders paid a paper
trader Mt 23,000/sack of yellow grain from this U.S. shipment.  Unexpectedly, they had to wait two
days in a market with rapidly falling prices before taking physical possession of the commodity.  By the
time they obtained the grain, the price at which they could sell had fallen to Mt 22,000-21,000/sack.
This episode reveals at least two problems.  First, these informal traders could not obtain physical
access to the good at will after purchasing the receipts with cash.  While one of the main objectives of a
system of warehouse receipts is to reduce the frequency of physical exchange, owners must be able
either to take physical possession or to sell the receipt to another buyer at any point in time.  If they
cannot, they will be subject to the kinds of risks that the Bazuca traders experienced, and the system
will not attract the volume of transactions it requires to function properly.  12  See above for information on the rate of turnover practiced by Bazuca floor traders and informal
retail traders.  It appears that traders at both levels are quite averse to significant stockholding.
13  As of March 1993, this system may no longer be in place.  But prior to this time, and during the data
collection periods, a quota system as described here did exist.
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The more general problem is one of poor information.  First, the Bazuca traders almost certainly
expected that they could take rapid possession of the grain following payment.
12  One must presume
that they did not know when they purchased the receipts that they would have to wait two days before
receiving the grain.  Had they known, they may have delayed their purchase or negotiated a lower price. 
Second, traders may not have been aware of how much grain had arrived and how quickly it was
moving to the market.  Thus, they were in a poor position to anticipate price movements over the days
immediately following their purchase.  The problem of poor information is a very important one in the
Maputo market, and it will be treated in more detail below.  
Questions remain about paper trading in Maputo's informal sector.  First, who are the paper traders? 
One hypothesis is that they are armazenistas who held quotas to buy from the consignees.  Legally,
consignees are to sell grain at officially mandated prices, and only to a list of quota holders established
by the Food Security Department of the Ministry of Commerce.  These quota holders are then to sell to
lojistas with whom they "normally" do business
13.  The system is meant primarily to ensure that some
commercial food aid reaches areas outside of Maputo, in accordance with calculations of apparent need
by the Food Security Department.  In practice, much of the food aid moves out of this administered
system and is sold at market determined prices to whomever will pay.  At what point this happens -
whether at the consignees' doors or later - is not yet clear.  It may be that consignees often do make
their first sales to quota holders, and that these become the paper traders.  An alternative hypothesis is
that the paper trade is entirely market driven, meaning essentially that there are no administrative
barriers to being a paper trader and that the prices these traders pay consignees vary with supply
conditions.  A final hypothesis is that the paper traders are not independent, but rather agents of the
consignees.  Each possibility has different implications for the effects and importance of paper trading
for the sector, and further research is warranted to evaluate each.  
Who pays for storage if the grain is with the armazenista after he has sold the receipt?  In a fully
developed system, storage would take place with an independent storage firm, and each owner would
pay storage from the time they take legal (not physical) possession of the product.  In Mozambique, the
system is not meant primarily for storage.  Turnover is likely rapid, with the result that the trader with
physical (but not legal) possession may cover all storage costs.  
Finally, what are the prospects for this commercial innovation to develop into an effective and low-cost
means of facilitating grain trading in Mozambique?  The answer to that question will depend on the
actions of private sector participants and the attitudes and actions of government officials in a position
to influence commercial behavior through the legal powers of the state.
4.  Specialization Among Floor Traders
Floor traders in Bazuca have clearly differentiated into two groups.  In one are the 57% that purchase
outside of the market, mostly from the Baixa, or from trucks that arrive in Bazuca.  This group buys
and sells the whole range of products found in the market, with the exception of unrefined yellow maize
meal.  Average purchase volume by these traders across all products was slightly more than 2.25 MT,
or 45 bags.  In sharp contrast, 43% of the traders purchased from other floor traders in Bazuca, and14  For example, in April 1992, Manica was charging only about 1,100 Mt per metric ton per month for
storage.  On a daily basis, this is less than 1% of the cost in the small warehouses around Bazuca.
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their average purchase volume was only 225 kg, or four to five bags.  This group includes some traders
of white and yellow grain and refined meals, but is dominated by traders of yellow whole meal.  In fact,
every trader of this product who was interviewed fell in this category.  No traders of rice, wheat, sugar,
or other products belonged to this group.  Note that these much smaller traders did not resell at retail,
by the caneca, but rather at wholesale, by the bag.
C. Marketing Costs and Margins
The informal wholesaling sector in Maputo might best be described as a low volume, low service
activity.  Marketing costs are not high relative to costs of purchasing the product, but few services are
embodied in the product.  Low volumes and strong competition from other traders mean that earnings
are low.
The fact that few services are embodied in the product at this level does not mean that these services are
unimportant.  Essentially, informal sector wholesalers provide two needed services.  The first is
"breaking bulk" for very small retailers.  Bazuca floor traders do this by typically purchasing between
25 and 60 bags from armazenistas or other large suppliers, and frequently selling a bag at a time to
retailers.  The capital limitation of informal retailers makes it essential that product be available for
purchase in these small quantities.  The second service provided by informal wholesalers is a locational
service.  By providing a single point (Bazuca) at which retailers from all over the city can purchase
their product, total travel time and transport cost for retailers is reduced.  One positive result for the
food system of the concentration of product in Bazuca is that price formation tends to be quite efficient. 
Prices across traders of the same product within Bazuca are practically identical except for quality
differences, the price is easily observed (increasing market transparency), and this sends a strong price
signal out to retail markets.
Costs incurred by informal wholesalers are for transport, storage of whatever proportion of their bags
they do not sell during the day of purchase, and taxes.  During July-August 1992, transport cost from
the Baixa to Bazuca was a fairly uniform 500 Mt per bag.  From Swaziland, the most typical cost was
1,500 Mt per bag.  In each case, traders had to pay an additional charge of 50 Mt to have the grain
unloaded from a truck to the point on the ground where they would conduct their sales.  Any grain that
the wholesaler does not sell during the day of purchase must be stored.  A number of small warehouses
around Bazuca provide this service, charging 200 Mt per bag per night.  This cost is extremely high
relative to typical long term storage costs.  For example, for a bag of yellow maize grain costing
25,000 Mt, annual storage costs in these warehouses would amount to 292% of the purchase price. 
Use of an installation meant for longer term storage (such as the Manica warehouses) would be much
cheaper
14.  Of course, these facilities around Bazuca are not meant for long term storage, and their very
close proximity to the market (most are within 50 meters of the sales floor) is valued by the traders. 
Too, warehouses for long-term storage may not often be available to those with the relatively small
quantities that these traders transact.  At any rate, the result, as previously noted, is that informal
wholesalers turn their product over very rapidly, thus minimizing storage costs.
Taxes are generally 200 Mt per bag per day.  Tax collectors charge based on the number of bags on the
ground.  If a bag is on the floor at Bazuca during more than one day, the trader may be charged for that
bag each day.  In practice, the collector does not appear every day, so that traders can count on
avoiding taxes on some days.  Nevertheless, the manner in which the taxes are calculated provides a28
strong incentive for traders to put onto the floor only what they think they will be be able to sell in one
or two days.  Combined with high short-term storage costs, this provides a further incentive for rapid
turn-over of product.  
These costs - transport, storage, and taxes - generally amount to about 1% of the purchase price paid
by floor traders.  Since the costs are fixed per bag, their proportion of purchase cost is less for more
expensive items.  For example, transport, storage, and taxes averaged 2.3% of purchase cost for yellow
maize grain traders, but only 1.2% for rice traders, and 0.95% for white maize grain traders.
Table 3 presents information on the net profitability of Bazuca floor traders of yellow maize grain,
white maize grain, rice, and unrefined yellow maize meal.  The data for these calculations were
collected between July 28 and August 3, from single interviews with individual traders, and represent
the earnings from sales of the last purchase the trader made.  Thus, they reflect only the margins earned
during this time, which happened to be a period of great price instability.  Nevertheless, there is reason
to believe that they are generally indicative of typical margins earned in the wholesale trade.  First,
price instability is the rule rather than the exception among staple foods in Maputo, so that this period
was not unique.  Second, the rapid product turnover which traders practice allows them to adapt quite
quickly to changing market conditions. 29
Table 3. Net Margins of Bazuca Floor Traders, Selected Days of July-August 199215  In other words, the income is not calculated as that needed to achieve 2,500 per adult equivalent with
some "least cost" consumption basket.  The calculation is based on what households actually buy, and
indicates the "typical" income level associated with a consumption of 2,500 calories per adult
equivalent in the household.
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Results in the table indicate that margins are generally positive but quite variable.  On average,
percentage margins for all but unrefined yellow maize meal are surprisingly low.  In three of four cases,
the margin standard deviation is larger than its mean, by factors that range from almost two to more
than six.  Mean percentage margins are well below 10% for all but unrefined yellow maize meal, and in
every case, significant percentages of traders earned negative margins.  Mean results for yellow maize
grain and unrefined yellow maize meal are skewed upwards by a small number of traders who earned
very large profits.  Median earnings are much lower than mean earnings in these cases, especially for
grain.  Over all products, the probability of negative earnings was 31%, and median daily earnings
were 7,680 Mt. 
What do these earnings imply about the economic status of these traders' households?  Addressing this
question requires an examination of typical household structures, including number of income
economically active members, and incomes needed to attain required calorie consumption levels.  Del
Ninno and Sahn define a poverty line of 31,904 Mt per capita per month, based on survey data
collected between October 1991 and April 1992.  Their definition is based on an econometrically
estimated relationship between income and calories consumed, using data from 1,800 households
surveyed in Maputo.  The line is defined as the predicted per capita income needed to achieve the
standard recommendation of 2,500 calories of consumption per adult equivalent, based on actual
expenditure patterns.
15  Based on an average household size of eight (Little; Graham, et al.), earnings
needed to reach required consumption levels were 255,232 Mt per month.  The median daily earnings
of 7,680 Mt from the Maputo Market Survey translate into median monthly earnings (assuming 6 work
days per week and 4.3 weeks per month), of approximately 200,000 Mt.  In other words, median
trading income among those surveyed is approximately 80% of what is needed to keep a family of
average size above the poverty line.  
Results from other studies on the number of income earners per household are relatively consistent. 
Graham, et al. report that 72% of male headed households in the Maputo area have at least two adults
earning incomes.  Only 35% of female headed households had at least two adult incomes, but these
households were only 17% of the total.  Over all households, 64% reported at least two incomes. 
Little, in his sample of vegetable and food traders, reports a slightly higher percentage (24%) of female
headed households.  He reports that 70% of all trader households had income in addition to that from
trading.  This figure is close to the 64% reported by Graham, et al. for all types of households.
Thus, we may conclude that approximately one-third of households in Maputo have only one income
earner.  For these households, the median earnings of traders surveyed in this study are not sufficient to
achieve acceptable levels of calorie consumption, given typical expenditure patterns.  For the
approximately two-thirds of households with more than one income earner, trading income may be
what makes the difference in keeping the family above the poverty line.  Further studies which track
trader earnings over longer periods of time would be useful in confirming these results.  31
VI. INFORMAL FOOD RETAILING IN MAPUTO
Informal food retailing in Maputo is overwhelmingly conducted by women, is extremely small scale,
and has very rapid product turnover.  Few services are embodied in most products, and earnings are
very low.  
Over the course of three months in late 1992, the research team collected information from 618 retailers
of white and yellow maize grains and meals regarding their last purchase.  Table 1 earlier in the report
showed the supply channels used by these traders.  Bazuca was most important, with over 60% of the
market, followed by the trader's own market with nearly 22%.  No other source exceeded 6.5%.  Of the
618 traders, 99.7% were women.  Turnover is quite rapid: 81% had purchased their product either the
day of the interview, or one day earlier.  
The rest of this section reports on retailers of unrefined yellow maize meal, which is the most
commonly sold staple in the retail markets surveyed.  Unrefined yellow maize meal represents the point
of entry for many women into the informal food trade.  Recall that the most common path for current
Bazuca floor traders was from this meal at retail to yellow grain at wholesale.  Across wholesalers of
all staples, 23% originally sold unrefined yellow meal at retail.  This is more than twice the figure for
any other product.  Due to the importance of this product at retail, the research team conducted a
separate survey of 28 vendors, to determine purchase quantities and practices, sales practices, and
marketing margins.
These traders are very small scale.  The modal and median purchase was a single sack of 50 kg.  There
appears to be a significant difference, however, between those who purchase grain (18 of the 28
interviewed) and those who purchase the product already milled (10 of 28).  Excluding a single outlier,
purchasers of meal bought an average of only 32 kg, and half purchased 15 kg or less.  Among those
who purchased grain and had it milled, the mean purchase was 65 kg, and none purchased fewer than
30 kg.  Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that those traders with the most extreme capital constraints
purchase small quantities of meal for immediate resale.  Those with a bit more capital will tend to
purchase somewhat larger quantities of grain and pay to have it milled.
Purchasers of grain must clean it, transport it to a mill, and transport it to the point of sale after milling. 
The only cash cost that most incur is milling.  All the grain purchasers clean it themselves, and two-
thirds transport the grain to the mill themselves, carrying it on their heads.  All surveyed markets have
small mills near them, generally within 100 or 200 meters.  Milling chargers were either 1,500 Mt or
2,000 Mt, though no difference in meal quality was noted based on the cost.  Retailers generally do not
pay for storage, preferring to take home the partial sack remaining after a day's work.  Retailers who
purchased flour generally reported incurring no cash costs other than for purchase of their maize meal
or grain.
Results show that margins are extremely low.  Margins appear also to vary systematically depending







Purchased Grain 2,693 19.0 0.23 13
Purchased Flour 565 8.3 0.00 6
Table 4. Profit Indicators for Retailers of Unrefined Yellow Maize Meal
presents indicators of net margins for retailers of unrefined yellow maize meal.  Daily earnings of those
purchasing grain are much higher, though more variable, than of those purchasing meal.  Neither trader
would be able to support an average size family simply from their earnings as traders.  Those
purchasing grain and working six days a week would earn only 70,018 Mt per month, barely enough to
achieve acceptable consumption levels for two people, based on del Ninno and Sahn's analysis.  Those
purchasing flour would earn only 14,690 Mt per month.  16  A forthcoming document entitled "The Economics of Food Aid Pricing and Distribution: Lessons
From Mozambique", investigates this issue in far more detail.
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VII. KEY FINDINGS AND POLICY ISSUES
Key issues in the informal food marketing system of Maputo are extreme price variability and the
associated issue of food aid impacts on the market, poor market information, and the very low volumes
of most traders and low service content of most products.
A.  Food Aid and Price Instability
Figures 1 and 2, and the discussion surrounding them, made it clear that maize staple prices in the
Maputo informal sector were highly volatile during the period of the study.  In fact, this volatility has
been a fundamental characteristic of most products in the sector for at least three years (Figure 8).  All
three key staples, yellow maize grain, white maize grain, and rice, have shown tremendous instability,
with monthly average prices on occasions doubling or falling by half in as little as two or three months. 
Weekly prices show even greater instability. 
Figure 8 suggests that, for yellow and white maize grain, probably the key factor leading to this
instability has been irregular arrivals of yellow maize food aid.
16  There have been two periods of very
sharp price increases for yellow maize since January 1990: a) from July/August 1991 to
October/November 1991, when prices nearly doubled, and b) from January 1992 to April-May 1992,
when prices again approximately doubled.  In both instances, white maize prices followed those of
yellow maize with a one or two month lag.  
Discontinuities in arrivals of commercial yellow maize food aid coincide exactly with these sharp price
run-ups.  Arrivals were practically continuous from July 1990 through July 1991, averaging
approximately 8,500 MT per month, with only two out of twelve months with no arrivals (August 1990
and February 1991).  Then, during August, September, and October 1991, no food aid arrived.  Yellow
maize prices rose each month, reaching a peak in October and remaining high in November.  White
maize prices began their rise a month later, and continued their rise through November. 
In November and December 1991, nearly 49,000 MT of GMA from the U.S. arrived in Maputo. 
Prices of both yellow and white maize fell sharply, with yellow prices bottoming out in January.  With
no food aid arrivals during four months, until May 1992, yellow prices rose very sharply through April
and remained high in May.  Once again, white prices continued their rise one month past yellow prices.
Even the one month price rise of July 1992 can be associated with discontinuities in yellow maize food
aid arrivals.  In May 1992, 32,500 MT of GMA arrived, breaking the price rise and decreasing yellow
prices that month and in June.  But then no maize arrived for two months, until August.  Prices
increased substantially in July.  It took two large arrivals in August and continued arrivals in October
and November to keep the price on a moderate downward trend. 34
Figure 8. Staple Prices and Yellow Maize Commercial Food Aid Arrivals in Maputo, March
1990 - January 199317  The Food Security Project has observed important changes in the rural marketing system. 
Increasingly, itinerant traders (comerciantes ambulantes) are entering the market, and appear in some
cases to be providing competition for more established lojistas.  Too, some armazenistas are beginning
to expand their rural collection networks.  The project will continue to monitor these positive
developments over time.
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Very short term price instability, specifically price increases, may also be associated with the delivery
of maize grain to one or very few consignees.  Recall from Section II.B that the EEC delivered its
15,000 MT of yellow grain from the July 28 arrival to only two consignees.  One important reason for
the EEC decision was to ensure payment of the counterpart funds.  Nevertheless, it may be argued that
such a distribution policy has important negative consequences for the market.  
In this case, one of the consignees did not sell any grain in the Maputo area, instead shipping it north to
Inhambane province for milling and sale.  As a result, the other consignee enjoyed a monopoly position
in the Maputo market until the arrival of the U.S. boat on August 12.  Section II.B of this report
documented the dramatic decrease in prices following the EEC arrival, but noted that prices also
showed a short price jump which may have been due to market power on the part of the consignee. 
This price jump can be seen clearly in the Bazuca market.  Yellow grain prices in this market reached
their peak just prior to the EEC arrival, exceeding 850 Mt/kg.  After the arrival, prices fell each day,
reaching 505 Mt/kg on August 3.  However, interviews with Bazuca traders on August 4 indicated that
the consignee selling the EEC grain in Maputo halted sales for two days (the reason for this action was
not clear).  Prices on August 5 jumped 10%, to 550 Mt/kg, before resuming their downward trend on
August 6.  From August 10 to August 12, they again jumped almost 10%, from 495 Mt/kg to 540
Mt/kg.  August 12 was the day that the U.S. ship arrived, though product did not begin arriving in
Bazuca until August 13.  Thus, the first price jump of 10% is clearly associated with the temporary
suspension of sales by the consignee, who was the only supplier of yellow maize at the time.  The
second price jump is quite difficult to explain when a ship holding 22,000 MT of grain was sitting in
port about to begin unloading.  Researchers suggest that both price increases may not have taken place
had their been a larger number of consignees of the EEC grain.
Rice prices have also been markedly unstable.  This instability does not show an easily discernible
relationship with yellow maize arrivals, but economic theory suggests that substitution by consumers in
response to price changes will transmit some of the yellow maize price instability to rice.  Substitution
between yellow and white maize is clearly the reason for the very close relationship between these two
prices.  Rice is imported both commercially and as food aid, and these arrivals are likely the principal
determinants of price movements for this product.
As the production and marketing system in Mozambique recuperates following the end of the war and
the improvement of the policy environment, the country's dependence on food aid will decline.  This
progress toward a self-reliant status may be slow, however.  Marketing infrastructure in rural areas,
including roads and rural stores, has been severely damaged.  Past policies of tight control over
economic activities have combined with the war to practically eliminate competitive marketing in many
areas.  In response, producers have adopted a strongly subsistence oriented food security strategy
(MOA/MSU Research Team, 1992).  This orientation, along with scarce marketing credit and the sheer
magnitude of investment needed to reconstruct the rural marketing system, all mean that producer
supply response is likely to be slow.
17  
Thus, yellow maize, rice, and other aid will likely continue to represent very significant portions of total
food availability for some years to come, especially in urban areas.  Too, as the marketing system18    Tschirley and Weber (1992) have proposed a means by which food aid might serve as an anchor of
stability around which an active production and private trading sector might emerge and flourish.  The
forthcoming project publication "The Economics of Food Aid Pricing and Distribution: Lessons from
Mozambique" will contain a detailed discussion of these two issues.
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becomes better integrated, the effects of food aid on urban markets will be increasingly transmitted to
rural areas.  Already, maize and rice prices in Inhambane and Gaza provinces appear to be strongly
influenced by Maputo prices.  This tendency toward improved market integration will only strengthen
over time.  Spatial market integration, and the strong relationship between yellow and white maize
prices demonstrated in Figure 8, also raise serious questions regarding the effects of continued yellow
maize food aid on incentives for domestic production of white maize.  Thus, it is imperative that
mechanisms be developed so that food aid will, at a minimum, not increase the level of price instability
in Mozambique.  Attention must also be directed toward minimizing any disincentive effects of the food
aid on domestic production incentives.
18
B.  Market Information
The problem of market information in Maputo has a number of dimensions.  The first and overriding
dimension is that information is "assymetric", meaning that, in any given transaction, certain market
actors tend to have systematic informational advantages over others.  Other dimensions relate to the
timing and quantity of commercial and especially food aid ship arrivals and unloading, prices in
geographically separate markets, product quality, and the size of bags at wholesale.  Assymetry is a
problem in each of these.
1.  Timing and Quantity of Ship Arrival and Unloading
The most dramatic evidence of assymetric information regards the timing and quantity of ship arrival
and unloading.  In light of the effects that such arrivals have on the market, information regarding them
is of the utmost importance, especially for wholesale traders.  Consignees, all of them formal sector
armazenistas, have the best information regarding food aid.  Informal sector floor traders in Bazuca
tend to be very poorly informed on this critical issue.  The market place is the center of much
speculation regarding when boats are to arrive and with how much product, but little authoritative
information is available at this level.  Section V.B.2 discussed the problems that some floor traders
encountered due to their poor information.  
Possibly the clearest evidence of poor information among floor traders on this issue is the startling lack
of anticipatory pricing in Bazuca.  In a well functioning market, prices reflect not only current but
anticipated supply conditions.  Commodity markets in the U.S. and other industrialized countries react
in anticipation of announcements of prospective harvests and other events which influence supply or
demand.  If the actual announcements are what was expected, they will typically have very little effect
on the market, which has already incorporated the information into its prices.  
In contrast, prices in Bazuca tend to react to ship arrivals only when the product begins to arrive at the
market.  At this point, the reaction can be dramatic.  The arrival of the EEC ship on July 28, 1992 is
the best documented case.  The day the ship arrived in port, prices remained extremely high in Bazuca,
around 42,000 MT per bag.  They only began to fall as product began to arrive at the market place,
and then fell rapidly to 26,000 Mt/bag.  It is striking that the market did not react even when the ship
was actually in the port, but rather required actual product flow to respond.  The research team believes
that the reaction to the U.S. arrival in May was similar, though it did not conduct intensive price
monitoring at that time to document the market's behavior.  19  See section V.B.1.
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The lack of anticipatory pricing in the informal sector suggests that poor information may contribute to
short term price volatility.  Had Bazuca floor traders correctly anticipated the EEC ship arrival and
incorporated this expectation into prices ahead of time, prices may not have risen so high nor fallen so
low as they did.  
2.  Relative prices in spatially separate markets
Food markets in Gaza and Inhambane provinces are increasingly integrated with those in Maputo
(Tschirley, 1993).  Such integration is predicated on the possibility of physical transport of goods, price
signals to serve as incentives for such transport, and the existence of traders with the capacity to
respond to these signals.  Information is key.  Until recently, there was no formal system of price
monitoring in Gaza and Inhambane provinces.  The emerging trade in the area depended on individual
traders informing themselves of relative prices in dispersed markets.  This information gathering was
often by trial and error, thus imposing large costs on the marketing system.  The research team during
July 1992 was able to document a case of a Bazuca floor trader who purchased a truck load of 50 kg
bags of yellow maize grain in Maputo at a price of 24,000 Mt/bag, shortly after the arrival of the EEC
boat with 15,000 MT of grain.  Recall that prices in Maputo had been extremely high prior to this
arrival.  Informal interviews with traders indicated that prices were even higher in Gaza and Inhambane
provinces.  Like many traders, this trader intended to transport the product to Gaza, and expected to
sell at more than 30,0000 Mt/bag.  With transport costs of 2,000 Mt/bag, she anticipated earning an
attractive profit.  Unfortunately, by the time this trader arrived at her destination, prices in Gaza had
fallen to 24,000 Mt/bag as well.  The trader decided to truck the grain back to Maputo rather than sell
in Gaza.
The research team does not believe this incident to be isolated.  The informational difficulties are
exacerbated by the fact that many informal traders have very little experience in the business.
19   These
traders have not been able to develop the network of informational contacts so crucial in any business,
and especially in the absence of publically available, timely information.  By contrast, many formal
sector armazenistas had commercial businesses in these provinces, and can be expected to be better
informed of market conditions.  In December 1992, the SIMA expanded its coverage into the capitals
and selected districts of Gaza and Inhambane provinces.  The price and qualitative supply information
the SIMA provides could play an important role in diminishing the informational assymetry and
generally raising the level of information among traders regarding relative prices in the region.  In
addition to this information, it is imperative that food aid arrival data be released in a timely manner
prior to ship arrival, and that it be made easily available to anyone desiring it.  This step alone could
have extremely positive effects on market stability.
3. Product quality
The lack of grades and standards in Mozambique means that nominally identical products in the same
market and on the same day can show great variability in quality.  This quality variability may or may
not be reflected in price differentials.  Purchasers, whether other traders or consumers, must therefore
be well informed and alert to these differences.  To the extent that they are not, market performance
suffers.  And even if they are sufficiently informed and alert, the effort this requires implies that
transactions are more costly than they might otherwise be.20  Note that the use of the term "preferred" makes no reference to price and therefore says nothing
about actual choices in the market.  Many poorer consumers choose to consume unrefined yellow maize
meal because the price is lower than all other meals.
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Maize meals provide probably the best illustration of varying product quality.  Section II.C. described
six different maize meal types, and noted that even these six did not fully reflect the extent of quality
variation.  For the uninitiated, even distinguishing between refined and unrefined meals is not
straightforward.  First, many traders will insist that their unrefined meal is refined.  Second, unrefined
meals can mimic refined meals if they are milled with a relatively coarse screen (local millers use three
different types of screens).  Finally, the research team has documented that some retail traders mix
refined and unrefined meals.
Among the refined meals, there is a continuum of levels of refinement, rather than a clean distinction
between refined and unrefined.  The local industrial mill, CIM, produces the least refined flour type,
and some traders claim that the level of refinement of CIM meals varies.  Refined white meal from
Swaziland is generally considered to be more refined and thus more preferred
20.  When sold by the
caneca, however, it may be difficult to distinguish between meals from Swaziland and from CIM. 
Finally, the highest quality refined meal is hand pounded.  These meals are generally distinguishable
from other meals, but they show quality differentiation, based primarily on the level of cleaning of the
grain prior to hand pounding.  In short, there is no simple distinction between refined and unrefined
meals.  Information and knowledge available to traders and consumers is imperfect, and this imposes
costs on the system.  
Other products also present difficulties related to quality.  During periods of scarcity and high prices,
very poor quality maize grain typically appears in the market.  At retail, the quality deterioration is
apparent.  But at wholesale, where the product is bagged, it may be very difficult and in practice
impossible to get a consistently accurate determination of product quality.  Rice shows sharp price
differences without any corresponding classification scheme.  The common terms of corrente for rice of
normal quality (with regards to grain length and brokens) and extra for better quality rice are often not
used by traders.  Two samples may each be called corrente, but have significantly different prices. 
Often the traders base the price differences on country of origin, but whether this is associated with
objective quality dimensions is not clear.  Wheat flour is either imported or produced domestically. 
Imported flour is generally considered to be more refined and therefore preferred to the national flour. 
Once the flour is out of its original bag, however, it can be extremely difficult to distinguish between
the two types.
The lack of agreed upon grades and standards, and the difficulty in distinguishing between different
qualities of product, put a heavy burden of knowledge and alertness on traders and consumers.  This in
turn provides room for opportunistic behavior on the part of traders who know the actual quality of the
product.  Uncertainty and transactions costs increase, and market performance diminishes.
4.  Bag sizes at wholesale
Bazuca floor traders of unrefined yellow maize meal often sell bags of product that weigh less than 50
kg.  Researchers frequently observed this phenomenon for this product, but very seldom observed it for
others.  Though careful empirical confirmation is difficult, researchers believe that the proportion of
bags weighing less than 50 kg increases significantly as the price of yellow maize meal rises.  By
producing unrefined yellow maize meal and selling it in bags weighing as little as 25 kg, Bazuca floor
traders may be argued to be providing a valuable service to capital constrained retailers.  These39
retailers may have only a fixed amount of cash with which to purchase their supplies.  Should the cost
of a 50 kg bag exceed this amount, they would be forced, at least temporarily, out of the market.  By
having the option of purchasing smaller bags, the probability of their having to leave the market is
reduced.  
Selling in bags of less than 50 kg also introduces a serious informational problem, however, and
provides scope for opportunistic behavior.  This practice may thus be argued to increase transactions
costs in the market and thereby increase prices to consumers.  In practice, the 50 kg bag has become
the standard unit of trade at wholesale.  Yellow maize grain and rice food aid is bagged off the ship in
50 kg bags, and many other products are first packaged in that weight.  Certain products such as
refined white maize meal from Swaziland are packaged in 60 kg bags, but this is widely known and
thus presents few if any informational difficulties.  When floor traders resell product without first
opening it, buyers can be confident that the actual weight is equal to the declared weight.  Once the bag
is opened, as sellers of unrefined yellow maize meal must do to mill the grain, the buyer can no longer
have such confidence.  In the specific case of unrefined yellow maize meal, floor traders may have bags
of many different weights on a given day.  Moreover, the traders tend to insist that their bag weighs 45
or 50 kg even when the weight is clearly less than that.  Retailers must become quite adept at judging
bag weights if they are to avoid serious losses upon resale.  
Thus, bag weights below 50 kg when prices are high provide benefits but also impose costs on retailers,
and by extension, on consumers.  Whether the benefits outweigh the costs is an empirical issue which
may not easily be resolved.
C.  Low Volume, Low Service Operations
Analysis presented earlier in this paper documented the low volume of most informal traders, and the
low service content of most products sold through the informal system.  The low service content may be
an appropriate and beneficial characteristic at this point in Mozambique.  Most Maputo consumers are
very poor by common standards, and are likely unwilling to pay the additional cost that would be
required for the market to provide these services.  The massive use of informal market places instead of
lojas would seem to validate this conclusion.  It may be argued that informal markets provide an
important benefit to consumers by giving them the option of purchasing products which embody fewer
services than those found in lojas (see section III.C for more discussion of this issue).  
The very low volumes and high rate of product turnover of most traders are best interpreted as an
adaptation to severe capital constraints and the lack of attractive alternatives for most traders.  With
very little capital, traders can purchase only small amounts of product at a time, and cannot afford to
store for any significant period.  Thus, volumes are small and turnover rapid.  With few employment
alternatives, many poor city residents are willing to engage in this activity for relatively low levels of
remuneration.  This is especially true of retailers.
These characteristics do not appear to hold significant benefits for consumers.  In fact, they likely stand
in the way of the kind of investment and associated innovation which is needed if the informal sector is
to become a more progressive and low cost operation.  It should be noted that simply relieving the
credit constraint for traders would at best be a partial solution.  As long as there are significant number
of underemployed residents of the Maputo area, the supply push (see section III.C.) will likely continue
to result in large numbers of very small traders eking out a living and able to invest little or nothing in
the growth of their business. 40
D.  The Legal Status of Informal Activities
The legal status of informal traders is ambiguous.  Most operate without licenses, but pay municipal
fees for use of market space or on the volume of product they transact.  Many of the products they
trade are either officially meant for other distribution networks (yellow maize through the NSA), or
arrive in Maputo without clear customs declarations (white maize meal and other products from
Swaziland).  The legality of selling food outside of established market stalls is still open to question, yet
the vast majority sell in this way (see Section IV.C.).  While the absence of a clear legal status is not
likely to lead to the disappearance of the sector, it may seriously inhibit the type of investment and long
term planning that are needed if the sector is to provide increasingly high quality products and services
at lower prices for poor consumers.
E.  The Policy Challenge
The informal food marketing sector in Maputo has shown itself to be energetic and dynamic in
responding to more open policies to provide needed products to millions of poor consumers in the
southern three provinces of the country.  The sector has thrived and will likely continue to do so in
large part because of its ability to meet the demand of poor consumers in ways that the formal food
marketing sector has not.  Nevertheless, this study has identified a number of problems and challenges
facing the sector.  Prices are highly unstable, imposing costs on traders, consumers, and ultimately
producers as well.  Information is very poor and unequally distributed, especially in regards to the
arrival of food aid and commercial imports.  Partly as a result, the informal sector exhibits almost no
anticipatory pricing, as would be expected in a better developed market.  Lack of standard qualities and
measurement units contributes to the information problem.  Most wholesale traders are very small
scale, and do not hold stocks for more than two or three days.  This is in part an adaptation to price
instability, but also contributes to it, as traders respond to, rather than anticipating, market conditions. 
Retail traders are extremely small, and most of those studied appear to earn the barest of livings. 
Credit, though not directly addressed in this study, appears to be sharply limited throughout the
informal sector.
The marketing sector links producers with consumers.  As such, it has enormous effects on the welfare
of both.  An inefficient or stagnant marketing system results in lower prices for producers, higher prices
for consumers, and little innovation to bring new products, technologies, and services to each.  An
incomplete or very high cost marketing system in rural areas will make it very difficult for producers to
respond to improved price and other policy incentives for food or cash crops.  Both producers and rural
and urban consumers will suffer.  In short, the agricultural marketing system has a key role to play in
the transition from poverty agriculture to sustained rural and urban economic growth.
The fundamental policy challenge facing Mozambican policy makers and donors is how to create the
conditions in which the marketing sector can transform itself from the commercial equivalent of T.S.
Schultz' "efficient but poor" farmer into a progressive marketing system anticipating consumer needs,
investing for the future, and efficiently serving both consumers and producers.  A number of steps are
needed if this is to happen.  One of the first should likely be a comprehensive review of all legal statutes
affecting the commercial sector.  The legal system needs to reflect the new reality of a market economy
in Mozambique, and should facilitate rather than impede full legal participation in that system.  Secure
legal status for all traders meeting minimal standards is a necessary building block for future
development of the marketing sector.
Investment in market infrastructure is badly needed.  A key challenge will be to achieve the proper mix
of public and private participation in this investment.  Free rider, social trap, and  other problems argue21  In late 1992, the government cleared-off an area next to an unused stadium on Ave. Acordos de
Lusaka, and made small investments to create a suitable surface for market stalls.  Authorities then
attempted to move vendors from surrounding streets into this area.  As of April 1993, the area was still
unused, and small retail traders could be found in their same locations along streets and walkways. 
One would hope that lessons could be learned from this experience before more expensive investments
are undertaken in other areas.  Numerous Third World cities have large, expensive market places
financed with development or public funds which sit unused or which are used far below capacity.
22  See the forthcoming "The Economics of Food Aid Pricing and Distribution: Lessons From
Mozambique" for more detailed analysis and recommendations in this regard.
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for some government role in the provision of infrastructure such as physical market places.  It is
imperative that the planning and implementation of these investments be done in a collaborative way
which recognizes the needs and limitations of the marketing sector as it exists today.
21  Roads are also
obviously needed, and fall clearly in the public domain.  Other investments such as storage capacity
might be more appropriately left to the private sector, yet government and donors may have roles in
facilitating such investments.  
Donors have an opportunity to use food aid for two purposes.  First, a properly managed food aid
program could bring much needed stability to the staple food market in the country.  Such stability is
badly needed if traders and producers are to begin undertaking the kind of medium and long range
planning and investment that the country will need to emerge from its current crisis.  Second, food aid
may be used to supplement shortfalls in supply as Mozambique's domestic cereals production begins to
recuperate.  At the same time, without careful management, food aid may create serious disincentives to
the emergence of a dynamic production and private trading network.
22
It is important that information on commercial and emergency food aid arrivals be made widely
available.  The lack of such information, except among consignees and distributors of emergency grain,
has contributed to the market instability which was demonstrated in this report.  Simply ensuring that
informal sector traders have access to the same level of timely information in this regard will do much
to level the playing field, and should help smooth price movements.  Of course, stabilizing actual
arrivals is also necessary.
Finally, timely market information on prices and supply conditions in cities and districts is of the
utmost importance.  The Agricultural Market Information and Analysis System of the Ministry of
Agriculture has a key role to play in this regard.  The recent expansion of this system into the southern
three provinces, and continued efforts at timely dissemination of the information, should help improve
the level of information for many traders.42
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Other Basuca Data Collection
  Product Inflow/Outflow  X X X X X X X X X X X X
  Floor Trader Interviews
    -  Yellow whole meal traders







  Census of traders and product present X X X X XX
  Storage volume & costs
Other Market Information
  Port visits XX
  Wholesaler interviews in "Baixa"
  Retailer interviews
    -  Xipamanine
    -  Componde




  Trader cost case studies X
  Bag & can weight experiments X X X X X X
  Milling experiments & data from APROC X
  EACM and COGROPA visits X XX
  NSA shop visits X
  Interviews with donors/consultants USAID
sem.
EEC Austral
1 The "caneca" has become the standard unit of measure in informal sector Maputo markets.  It is a 750 ml can that orignally held
powdered milk.  Filled over the rim with product from the market, it holds between 800 ml and 850 ml.
Figure 1. Research Activities Matrix, MOA/MSU/USAID Maputo Market Study (June 29 - August 25, 1992)Figure 5. Partial Map of the City of Maputo, with Location of Principal Informal Market PlacesProduct
Mean

















Yellow Maize Grain 83,873 211,348 3.60 16.0 -10.0 33,549 9,000 0.33 21
White Maize Grain -8,500 53,868 1.20 11.0 -18.0 -3,400 -100 0.52 23
Rice 21,706 84,298 0.60 6.0 -8.0 8,632 9,690 0.25 8
Unrefined Yellow Maize Meal 30,650 29,875 19.00 48.0 -10.0 12,260 8,762 0.14 29
Table 3. Net Margins of Bazuca Floor Traders, Selected Days of July-August 1992Figure 8. Staple Prices and Yellow Maize Commercial Food Aid Arrivals in Maputo, March 1990 - January 1993